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WJ du Plessis* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 entitles per-
sons or communities "whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past ra-
cially discriminatory laws or practices" to tenure which is legally secure. Section 
25(9) commands parliament to enact legislation to provide for such tenure security. 
The subsequent White Paper on Land1 highlighted some principles with regard to the 
security of tenure, and made specific reference to tenure security in the former 
homelands,2 where African indigenous land tenure3 was held in trust by the govern-
ment that issued permits to black people in these homelands.4 The idea is that ten-
                                                          
*  Elmien du Plessis. BA (International Relations), LLB, LLD (US). Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg. E-mail: elmiendp@uj.ac.za. This article 
is based on a paper presented at the 13
th
 Biennial Conference of the International Association for 
the Study of the Commons (IASC), Hyderabad, India, January 10
th
 to 14
th
, 2011. 
1  South African Land Policy White Paper (1997). 
2  The apartheid government issued various laws in the hope of segregating the different groups in 
South Africa. The first of the so-called "land acts" was the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 which pro-
vided for the areas where occupation was restricted to black persons only. In the urban areas, 
segregation was driven by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923; the Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; and the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984. The Black 
Land Act was succeeded by the South African Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 
which provided for "released areas", also restricted to black people. On the other hand, the 
Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 regulated the acquisition, alienation and occupational rights to land 
and provided for four independent nation states, the so-called homelands (Transkei, Bophu-
thatswana, Ciskei and Venda), and six self-governing territories (KwaNdebele, QwaQwa, Gazan-
kulu, Lebowa, KwaZulu-Natal and KaNgwane). The segregation of people and the division of 
land was made possible by legislation authorising the (forced) removal and the eviction of the 
people from their land. Every area had its own specific regulations and town planning rules. By 
the time of the advent of the new South Africa, about 17 000 statutory measures had been is-
sued to segregate and control land division, with 14 different land control systems in South Afri-
ca. Before the change an estimated 3,5 million people had been displaced by apartheid land law, 
and 80 percent of the people in South Africa lived on 18 percent of the land (South African Histo-
ry Online Date Unknonw www.sahistory.org.za). For a more detailed discussion see Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 256 and Claassens 1993 
SAJHR 422. 
3  The term "African indigenous land tenure" is preferred to "traditional" or "customary" land rights in 
this paper, since the author is of the view that the terms "traditional" and "customary" may be too 
restrictive. 
4  The system was more complex than can be elaborated on in this article. The 1913 Land Act is 
usually regarded as the first of the spatial segregation acts, and permitted Africans to live only in 
certain areas (7 percent of the land). The 1936 Land and Trust Act added another 6 percent to 
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ure reform must move towards rights and away from the permits that were in place 
during apartheid. The aim is also to unify the system of land rights and to get rid of 
the second-class system for black people that was developed during apartheid. 
There was also a call in the White Paper that people should be allowed to choose 
the tenure system appropriate to their circumstances (that would include group and 
individual rights, or a combination of these), provided that the system adheres to the 
Constitution's commitment to basic human rights and equality. A rights based ap-
proach was proposed for this - one that also recognises the de facto rights in law.5  
 
The problem, however, is how to recognise and secure tenure rights. Should tenure 
be secured in the private ownership paradigm, or should indigenous forms of land 
tenure be fully recognised and thus protected.6 Due to the domination of private 
property in the officially recognised laws of South Africa before the advent of consti-
tutional democracy, the inclination is towards protection in the private ownership 
paradigm. The success of such an approach is questionable, and in the recent case 
of Tongoane v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs7 the Constitutional 
Court declared the Communal Land Rights Act,8 which was meant to be the legisla-
tion securing indigenous land rights, unconstitutional.9 The problem therefore re-
mains: how do we secure indigenous land rights? 
 
This contribution does not purport to provide an answer to this complex question. 
Rather, it investigates whether or not the African indigenous land tenure system can 
be analysed within the framework of the commons. It aims to investigate whether the 
framework of the commons can provide different insights, or perhaps a different vo-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the land that Africans could occupy. This land was held in trust, and Africans could hire, pur-
chase or occupy this land. Legislation was passed (the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927; the 
Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951; and the Black Areas Land Regulations (Proclamation R.188 of 
1969), to name a few) that drastically reduced a landholder's ability to alienate, transfer or be-
queath land. The allocation of land was dependant on White officials who followed strict regula-
tions that did not accommodate African indigenous land tenure systems. See Cousins "Politics of 
Communal Tenure Reform". 
5  For the principles see para 4.18 South African Land Policy White Paper (1997). 
6  Claassens and Cousins pose this question in Claassens and Cousins (eds) Land, Power and 
Custom 9. 
7  Tongoane v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 6 SA 214 (CC). 
8  Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004. 
9  The Constitutional Court focused only on the procedural aspects of the adoption of the Act, and 
not on the substantive issues raised. 
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cabulary, whereby indigenous land tenure can be secured in the current ownership 
paradigm10 without African indigenous land tenure losing its unique character. 
 
This article will do this by first looking at pre-colonial land tenure to investigate the 
root of contemporary indigenous land holdings and the characteristics of such ten-
ure. Thereafter it will discuss the development of indigenous land tenure and the co-
lonial and private property right influences on tenure, and the linguistic problems that 
developed in describing African indigenous land tenure. A brief overview of the 
commons will follow, after which the applicability and the usefulness of the discourse 
of the commons for African indigenous land tenure will be assessed. The conclusion 
will discuss the possible usefulness of the framework of the commons for securing 
land rights. 
 
The background with which the indigenous land rights section of this contribution 
should be understood requires a brief explanation of what the commons entails.11 In 
the commons framework property rights are divided in two main groups: use rights 
(that is the access to a resource, withdrawal from a resource or exploitation of a re-
source for economic benefit) and control or decision-making rights (rights to man-
agement, exclusion and alienation). In the commons model, several individuals or 
groups can have different rights over the same resource. This means that even if the 
state, for instance, has the control rights over a resource, a community can have the 
use rights, and different segments of the community can have different use rights.12 
The framework of the commons allows for multiple rights in the same resource to be 
acknowledged and protected, and provides an organisational framework on how 
such rights and the conflict between the users of the rights can be managed. The 
framework of the commons recognises communities' own ability to organise them-
selves and the various rights in the resource without relying on the traditional prop-
erty law model of ownership. The term was popularised in the late 1960s when Har-
                                                          
10  Whether or not it should be protected in an ownership paradigm is a separate debate all to-
gether, one which is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of this contribution it will 
therefore be assumed that protection in an ownership paradigm is the most viable route at the 
moment. At a recent colloquium on "Development, Pluralism and Access to Resources" held at 
the University of Cape Town, Pope asked if indigenous law land rights are in fact insecure. See 
Pope "Indigenous law land rights". Likewise the scope of this contribution will not look into that 
debate, and will assume that in the ownership paradigm, indigenous law land rights are insecure. 
11  See para 3 for a more detailed discussion. 
12
 
 CAPRi Resources, Rights and Cooperation 9. 
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din advocated that allowing individuals free and unlimited access to a form of com-
mons would lead to a tragedy. The tragedy lies in the individuals' seeking to maxi-
mise their gains and exploit the commons, since they gain directly by exploiting, but 
share the costs of such exploitation amongst the other users. The solution to this, 
according to Hardin, is privatisation and regulation.13 
 
2 The history of African land tenure 
 
2.1 Pre-colonial African indigenous land tenure 
 
In pre-colonial times the indigenous peoples of South Africa had abundant land, with 
farming and herding being the predominant economic activities.14 Environmental fac-
tors such as rainfall, topography, soil and the availability of water influenced the 
economy of the indigenous peoples. In KwaZulu-Natal this meant that the patterns of 
residence and political authority were largely limited to independent homesteads.15 
The existence of these independent homesteads resulted in a relatively decentral-
ised structure of political authority, with every unit having access to abundant re-
sources allowing for a self-sufficient existence.16 On the Highveld the situation was 
different. The sparse water and harsh climate meant that homesteads were concen-
trated around whatever water was available, and also meant that political authority 
was centralised and concentrated in villages which comprised of up to a thousand 
inhabitants. Due to the climate, agriculture was difficult and risky and therefore not 
intended to create wealth. The focus was on livestock, the farming of which was less 
risky and labour intensive.17 
 
Cattle were most valued and often used in ceremonies and celebrations to establish 
or re-confirm social relations.18 Despite the exchange of cattle and other products 
there were no regular traders and marketplaces. Material possessions had more so-
cial and ritual importance than economic value.19 
                                                          
13  Hardin 1968 Science 1244. 
14  Bennett Customary Law 371. 
15  Bennett Customary Law 371. 
16  Bennett Customary Law 371. 
17  Bennett Customary Law 372. 
18  Bennett Customary Law 372. 
19  Bennett Customary Law 373. 
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Cousins elaborates on the communal land rights system, emphasising the political 
and social embeddedness of land rights.20 He sketches a picture of pre-colonial land 
tenure, when "[l]and tenure was both 'communal'21 and 'individual', and can be seen 
as 'a system of complementary interests held simultaneously'".22 He then proceeds 
to sketch how colonial rule changed it.23 This often entailed the colonial state's trying 
to retain a form of "communal" land tenure that might suit its interests.24 
 
The concept of "ownership" was therefore limited in pre-colonial South Africa and 
more often embedded in status relationships. Put differently, African indigenous law 
in property was more concerned with people's obligations towards one another in re-
spect of property than with the rights of people in property. The relationships be-
tween people were more important than an individual's ability to assert his or her in-
terest in property against the world. Entitlements to property were more in the form of 
obligations resulting from family relationships than a means to exclude people from 
the use of certain property.25 Property in pre-colonial Africa can thus be said to have 
been "embedded" in social relationships rather than giving rise to an individual's ex-
clusive claim over it as private property.26 
 
In 1989 Okoth-Ogendo remarked that studies on African indigenous land tenure are 
mostly descriptive, without much regard to the theories that underlie such systems.27 
This influenced the discussion on land reform in that the descriptive analysis was al-
ways done within the theoretical framework of Roman law, with a predominance of 
the doctrine of ownership, rather than the property itself becoming the focal point.28 It 
                                                          
20  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 110. 
21  Earlier in the chapter he notes that "communal" and "customary" are not synonyms. Communal 
land rights systems that do not derive from customary law nor are dependent on a traditional au-
thority for the management of the tenure also exist (Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 110). 
22  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 111. 
23  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 111. 
24  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 111. In the Cape Colony the Glen Grey Act 25 of 
1894 (C) attempted to individualise customary tenure by allowing only one arable plot per mar-
ried man, and only the titleholders were allowed to graze their cattle on the commonage. This 
system, however, reverted to 'communal' tenure (Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 
111). 
25  Bennett Customary Law 373. 
26  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 60. 
27  Okoth-Ogendo 1989 Africa 6. 
28  Okoth-Ogendo 1989 Africa 7. 
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may therefore be useful to investigate African indigenous land rights in the theoreti-
cal framework of the commons. 
 
2.2 African indigenous land tenure today 
 
2.2.1  Introduction: the language barrier of the common law 
 
African indigenous law had limited scope to develop at its own pace and based on its 
own principles, as the colonial conquest introduced a market economy and African 
indigenous law was, at least officially and as far as property was concerned, re-
placed by common law.29 Common law brought with it a new vocabulary that made it 
difficult, if not impossible, to interpret African indigenous law land tenure.30 The con-
cept of "ownership" is particularly problematic, as is the idea that before "ownership" 
all things were held in common with everybody having equal rights to the same 
thing,31 or belonged to nobody. Bennett asserts that "[i]t is more likely that, before 
the concept of individual ownership emerged, only rights of use were protected".32 
This implies that for short periods of time, while a resource was in use, other people 
could be excluded, and protection was needed for short terms only. The need for 
longer-term protection arose only with the move from a nomadic lifestyle to a more 
settled lifestyle.33 With the settlement of people on land and the cultivation of such 
land and the herding of cattle, resources became more scarce. With the increased 
scarcity of resources, the need for the regulation of access and the protection of 
                                                          
29  Bennett Customary Law 373. The "common law" terminology can be confusing. Roman-Dutch 
law is based on Roman law, a statement that implies that the history of South African law has a 
Roman law foundation, a heritage South Africa shares with Western Europe. "Common law" as a 
term refers mostly to Roman-Dutch law as it was adapted and developed in South African case 
law and custom. "Common law" is usually distinguished from other sources of law such as legis-
lation and customary law. Law, as developed in case law in England, is also referred to as 
"Common Law". This "Common Law" forms the basis of law in Anglo-American law and was 
scarcely influenced by Roman law. The law of equity, however, plays a significant role in the 
English "Common Law". To make things somewhat more confusing, the South African common 
law was influenced by the English Common Law. See Du Plessis Introduction to Law 19-20. To 
simplify things, when reference is made to the Roman-Dutch common law it will be written in the 
lower case, while if reference is made to the English Common Law, the letters will be capitalised. 
30  Bennett Customary Law 374. 
31  Bennett Customary Law 374. 
32  Bennett Customary Law 374. 
33  Bennett Customary Law 375. 
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rights arose.34 The control of land therefore became a monetary advantage, and 
competition to control it grew.35 
 
With the introduction of commerce, an exchange value had to be attached to a 
commodity, and in this context ownership provided the answer to securing the prop-
erty.36 With ownership came the idea of "absoluteness", which implied that one per-
son could hold all of the entitlement in a certain property and dispose of it at free 
will.37 This differs remarkably from the pre-colonial era where different interests in the 
same property could vest in different holders,38 and where furthermore these inter-
ests are flexible and ever changing.39 
 
The colonists assumed that the language of ownership was universally applicable 
and also assumed that the concept of "ownership" was applicable only to "civilized" 
societies. The colonists also "assumed that land must have an owner, even where 
rights had never been defined".40 The fact that "ownership" was a strange concept to 
indigenous groups meant that the government could appropriate this "unowned" 
land.41 If a dispute arose between Africans about land, common law was used to re-
solve the dispute instead of the court's developing African indigenous law to fill such 
gaps.42 Some people attempted to overcome the problem of indigenous land tenure 
and its incompatibility with the notion  of "ownership" by stating that land was "com-
                                                          
34  Bennett Customary Law 375. 
35  Chanock Land, Custom and Social Order 231. 
36  Bennett Customary Law 375. 
37  For a discussion of the concept "absolute ownership" in the African customary land tenure con-
text, see Allot 1961 Journal of African Law 99; Simpson 1961 Journal of African Law 145. Allott's 
discussion of the problem is based on the English law that requires registration of title to land and 
a limited choice of title that can exist in respect of land. In the absence of an adequate vocabu-
lary to describe and therefore register certain interests under customary law, the risk remains 
that such interests and the land in which such interests are held would be unowned. 
38  Bennett Customary Law 375. See also Allot 1961 Journal of African Law 100 where Allot dis-
cusses the practical implications of this with registration. He asks how the official who needs to 
register title in a piece of land will handle the problem of the chiefs that claim paramount control 
over the lands, families claiming to be owners of lands, and the re-parcelled sections of land be-
ing handed to individuals. Who must he register? For criticism see Simpson 1961 Journal of Afri-
can Law 145. 
39  Allot 1961 Journal of African Law 100. 
40  Chanock Land, Custom and Social Order 232. 
41  Bennett Customary Law 375. 
42  Bennett Customary Law 377. See Chanock Land, Custom and Social Order 232 for a discussion 
of how this worked in practice. 
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mon to all people"43 and "communal",44 or that communities as "corporate entities" 
should make the decisions regarding access to and the use of land.45 
 
However, the use of the term "communal" is problematic.46 Bennett47 sums up the 
problem by stating that the popular use of the word "suggest[s] that groups of peo-
ple, who are closely bound together by common interests and values, share land for 
purposes of subsistence" rather than the more unobjectionable idea that all members 
of the community have equal claims to land, that "membership of a political commu-
nity is the basis of an individual's entitlement to land" or that an individual is not free 
to dispose of land at will.48 The idea that land is farmed collectively and that the pro-
duce is then shared is erroneous.49 The legal concept "communal" is also confusing. 
On the one hand it can mean that a right is held by a group jointly (one property, in-
separable title), while on the other hand it can mean that it is held by a group in 
common (one property, separate but with the same title in land). The latter term is 
useful only insofar as the right to pasture and natural resources is concerned, but not 
as far as African indigenous tenure is concerned. 50  
 
Likewise the term "trust" was also used in an attempt to describe African indigenous 
tenure. This means that the bare title vests in the indigenous group, with the chief as 
the trustee, and "usufructuary" rights being granted to the individuals that enjoy 
beneficial occupation. The use of the word "trust" is also problematic, since the "usu-
fructuary" rights granted to an individual do not amply describe the interest in African 
indigenous law, nor do these people have a remedy against the traditional leader as 
trustee, as they would have under trust law.51 
 
Okoth-Ogendo regards the insistence on using common law concepts to explain and 
define African indigenous land tenure as "more than just an intellectual error" and 
part of the bigger design of the colonial authorities to justify expropriation of land, as 
                                                          
43  Bennett Customary Law 377. 
44  Bennett Customary Law 377. 
45  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 99. 
46  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 99. 
47  Bennett Customary Law 377-378. 
48  Bennett Customary Law 378. 
49  Bennett Customary Law 378. 
50  Bennett Customary Law 378. 
51  Bennett Customary Law 379. 
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land in this framework is regarded as "dead capital".52 One of the consequences of 
this is that tenure insecurity is the reality in most areas of land held under African in-
digenous law, as is evident in South Africa.53 This is not because African indigenous 
law property systems are inherently insecure, but rather due to "the dislocation of 
these systems from the social and institutional context that defines and sustains 
them" and the application of the indigenous law in the colonial legal framework.54 
How should African indigenous land tenure be understood, then? This question will 
be answered by looking at the characteristics of African indigenous law land tenure 
before providing an alternative vocabulary for understanding African indigenous land 
tenure. 
 
2.2.2 The characteristics of indigenous law land tenure today 
 
The previous paragraphs argued that customary law cannot be described in common 
law concepts, since the concepts used are culturally specific and foreign to indige-
nous law.55 Bennett instead uses the words "right", "power" and "interest" to describe 
African indigenous land tenure.56 He bases this on Allott's analytical scheme, which 
first seeks to identify the status of the interest holder,57 secondly to look at the con-
tent of the interest,58 and lastly to look at the uses of particular land in order to de-
termine what rights and powers can be exercised over the land.59 When one uses 
this scheme, one can understand that it is possible for two or more interest holders 
to simultaneously exercise rights and powers on the same piece of land. "Allott's 
                                                          
52  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 98. 
53  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 98. 
54  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 98. 
55  Bennett Customary Law 379. 
56  Bennett Customary Law 380. 
57  Bennett Customary Law 380. People acquire interest in land by belonging to a political unit such 
as a family, ward or nation. 
58  Bennett Customary Law 380. One looks at the interest to determine what a holder may and may 
not do, and what limitations and affinities are contained in their interests. These interests are di-
vided between "benefit" (the right to use and enjoy land) and "control" (the power to decide who 
may benefit). 
59  Bennett Customary Law 380. The uses to which land is put determine the rights and power that 
are attached to it. For example: while dry grassland is set aside for the grazing of herds belong-
ing to the members of a community, fertile land is reserved for individual cultivation of land. 
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scheme", Bennett states "frees us from the ownership paradigm"60 where tenure 
seems to be "a system of complementary interests held simultaneously".61 
 
Okoth-Ogenda reconceptualises indigenous land rights systems by debunking the 
myth that indigenous land rights systems are necessarily "communal" in nature, that 
"ownership" is collective and that the community as an entity makes collective deci-
sions about access to and the use of land.62 He offers a different understanding of 
indigenous land right systems. For him, the social order (ie how people relate to 
each other rather than an individual to his property) creates "reciprocal rights and ob-
ligations that binds together, and vests power in the community members over 
land".63 To determine who will be granted access to, or exercise control over, land 
and the resources, one needs to look at these rights and obligations and the per-
formances that arise from them. This will leave only two distinct questions unan-
swered: who may have access to the land (and what type of access)64 and who may 
control and manage the land resources on behalf of those who have access to it?65 
 
In African indigenous law land tenure, land structures social relations.66 Okoth-
Ogendo describes the structure as an "inverted pyramid", where the tip is the family, 
                                                          
60  Bennett Customary Law 381. 
61  Bennett Customary Law 381. Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 96-98 highlights five ju-
ridical fallacies that underlie the colonial and post-colonial doubt about the applicability of indige-
nous law in general. Firstly, early anthropologists did not regard indigenous law as "law" at all. 
Secondly, it was believed that indigenous law conferred no property in land. Thirdly, the convic-
tion that radical title could only vest in the sovereign. Fourthly, the belief that indigenous commu-
nities had no juristic personality and lastly, the assumption that "indigenous and social govern-
ance institutions were incapable of, or unsuitable as, agents for the allocation of land and the 
management and resolution of disputes relating to land". One of the main consequences of these 
fallacies is that the nature and content of indigenous land rights are misrepresented and dis-
torted, and the clear distinction in indigenous law between the individual and collective land rights 
is continuously denied. This review focuses on the second and last fallacy, and how a better 
conception of the conditions that give rise to the fallacies might help solve the problem. 
62  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 100. See chapter 5, where Ben Cousins lists this as one 
of the problems with CLARA (Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 132). 
63  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 129 complements Okoth-Ogendo's chapter in providing 
examples that fit Okoth-Ogendo's conceptual framework. He also analyses the customs of vari-
ous people in South Africa in order to point out distinctive features of "communal" tenure regimes 
in South Africa, based on Okoth-Ogendo's conceptual framework, that highlights the social em-
beddedness and inclusive nature of African indigenous land rights and the distinction between 
access to land and control of land. This further echoes Singer's idea that property law reflects 
and shapes social relations. Property "is an intensely social institution. It implicates social rela-
tionships that combine individualism with a large amount of communal responsibility" (Singer 
Edges of the Field 3). 
64  See Cousins' comments and examples in Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 122. 
65  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 100. 
66  Bennett Customary Law 381. 
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the middle is the clan lineage, and the base is the community.67 It is one's standing 
in the group that provides access to land, and social relations are therefore more im-
portant than a relationship with the land itself.68 One's situation is determined not 
only by present-day social relations but also by a connection with the past,69 as it is 
believed that the ancestors are attached to the land.70 The fact that those who con-
trol the land have a transgenerational obligation to preserve the land also means that 
the ability to alienate the land from people outside the group is limited.71 
 
The control of access to land should be viewed in the context of social relations.72 
Since traditional leaders derive their legitimacy from the founding fathers and are 
seen as a direct channel to communicate with the ancestors, they have certain pow-
ers with regard to the land.73 They have power to allot the land, to regulate the use of 
common resources, and expropriate and confiscate land in certain circumstances.  
 
When the chief allots land, he not only allocates land to families but also dedicates 
certain lands for grazing and agricultural use.74 Such decisions are not made collec-
tively but they are made with reference to the common values of each level of the 
pyramid as discussed above.75 Even though the scarcity of land means that the 
chief's role in allocating land is diminishing, he still plays an important role in confirm-
ing the transfer of land that takes place in practice. In doing so he has a duty to "act 
like a father" in making sure that the land is distributed fairly between households.76 
The allocation of land was traditionally free, while today it is common to offer some 
form of payment as a thank-offering.77 
 
                                                          
67  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
68  Chanock Land, Custom and Social Order 231. 
69  Okoth-Ogendo1989 Africa 11. 
70  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
71  Okoth-Ogendo1989 Africa 11. 
72  Bennett Customary Law 382. 
73  Bennett Customary Law 382. Some traditional leaders view themselves as "owners" of the land 
because of this, and sold the mineral rights or rented the land. This is, according to Bennett, due 
to a misunderstanding of the principles of traditional leadership, which require a traditional leader 
to always govern for the benefit of the nation. 
74  Bennett Customary Law 383. See also Bennett's comments that this is not so prevalent today 
due to the scarcity of land and the fact that most people settle on land on a relatively permanent 
basis. 
75  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
76  Bennett Customary Law 384. 
77  Bennett Customary Law 384. 
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Traditionally, exercising the power to regulate the resources entails that the chief de-
cide when and how these resources are used. When formulating the rules pertaining 
to access, he must exercise his discretion for the public good.78 In the 19th century 
the colonial powers tried to and in some instances succeeded in breaking down the 
chiefly power, replacing the chief with (white) magistrates. The lack of the recognition 
of African indigenous law in the formal structures introduced by the magistrates 
helped play a role in undermining the chiefly powers.79 The apartheid laws and struc-
tures broke chiefly power down even further, often grouping people together that had 
no historical ties with one another, and appointing traditional leaders who would ad-
vance the apartheid government's policies.80 African indigenous systems of land 
tenure "managed" by the chiefs were replaced by government regulations that only 
allowed for quitrent (where annual rent was paid to the state) and permission to oc-
cupy was granted by the state.81 
 
As an individual you also have certain rights and duties with regard to the land. You 
have a right of avail,82 that is, to receive land to build houses coupled with access to 
the commonage;83 and you have a right to residential sites and arable fields and 
grazing.84 The right of avail is restricted to the extent that access to land is depend-
ent on an affiliation with the ward where the land is situated.85 The right to residential 
sites and arable fields usually implies that a member of the community will have two 
plots – one for housing and one for farming. The holder of both these plots will have 
                                                          
78  Bennett Customary Law 385. This means that the chief must consider the people's welfare espe-
cially in connection with the environment. For instance: the killing of animals may be prohibited if 
the animal species borders on extinction. Likewise, the burning of grass may be prohibited when 
it is dry. The problem with effective action at environmental protection is that there are no coher-
ent policies due to the decentralised nature of the political set-up; human needs are given priority 
over the environment and due to poverty and overpopulation in the modern state, environmental 
concerns are sometimes elided. See Bennett Customary Law 385. See also Delius "Contested 
Terrain" 221. 
79  Delius "Contested Terrain" 221. 
80  Cousins "Politics of Communal Tenure Reform" 62. Of course it was more complex than its de-
scription here. A more detailed historical account can be found in Du Plessis and Pienaar 2010 
Fundamina 73-114. 
81  Cousins "Politics of Communal Tenure Reform" 56; Delius "Contested Terrain" 225. One of the 
substantive objections to the Communal Land Rights Act 8 of 2004 was that it would re-enforce 
the apartheid boundaries and the apartheid system of land governance, and that the traditional 
power of chiefs would not be seen as legitimate by the community. 
82  Bennett Customary Law 388. 
83  Bennett Customary Law 391. 
84  Bennett Customary Law 398. 
85  Bennett Customary Law 391. It is possible to get access to land even if you are not a member of 
the ward, but there are strict rules that regulate such access. 
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exclusive rights over the land and is protected from trespass, but the rights are re-
stricted to the extent that the uses of the plots are restricted to the cultivation of 
crops for domestic consumption.86 Members may also graze their stock on the com-
monage. As far as the commonage is concerned, no individual may claim exclusive 
use of the land.87 Again, access to the commonage is based on socially-defined 
membership that is reinforced and managed within the group, based on the recipro-
cal obligations of the members in the social hierarchy.88 
 
The rights in these lands can also be taken away.89 Since land cannot be inherited 
rights are also lost at the death of the holder.90 Traditionally land could not be alien-
ated by sale. The pre-colonial concept of land was that it is god-given and cannot be 
appropriated. With colonialism came a real estate market, the common law concept 
of ownership, property law and contract. Land is also a scarce resource, and indi-
viduals are more inclined to assert exclusive rights over the land. The ability to alien-
ate African indigenous land is furthermore restricted by the Upgrading of Land Ten-
ure Rights Act.91 The fact that it could not be alienated by sale and acquired only 
through membership of a group is an indication that property has more of a social 
function than a transition of wealth. 
 
2.3 Preliminary analysis of African indigenous land tenure 
 
The characteristics of African indigenous land tenure are firstly that land is held as a 
transgenerational asset, secondly that it is managed on different levels of the social 
organisational structure, and lastly that it is used in function-specific ways.92 Access 
to and the control of land depends on an individual's place in the social order of the 
community. 
 
                                                          
86  Bennett Customary Law 392. Commercial farming is generally not allowed. Land assigned to 
residential housing normally includes space for a garden where some crops are planted. See 
Bennett Customary Law 394. 
87  Bennett Customary Law 398. 
88  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
89  Bennett Customary Law 399. Before colonisation abandonment was probably the most common 
way of losing rights, but due to the scarcity of land and the more settled lifestyle it is debatable 
whether this still happens often. 
90  Bennett Customary Law 402. 
91  Sections 2(1), 3(1), 19(2) Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. 
92  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
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It has been shown that the natural development of the traditional African indigenous 
system of land tenure was stunted by the colonial ideological framework of private 
ownership, which was perpetuated by the post-colonial governments. African indige-
nous land tenure was interpreted in this framework in such a way that the people's 
relationship with the land was not recognised, and the land held in terms of indige-
nous tenure was often declared res nullius due to its not being "owned" in the com-
mon law sense.93 These lands were then converted into individualised private prop-
erty, in accordance with a system, as indicated above, foreign to African indigenous 
land tenure,94 often managed by legislation or interpreted in the common law legal 
framework. It is when African indigenous land tenure is seen from the perspectice of 
the common law legal framework that it seems to be insecure. The question then is: 
is there an alternative framework that can accommodate the unique characteristics 
of African indigenous land tenure within the common law ownership framework that 
can help secure these rights? This is where the framework of the commons might be 
helpful. 
 
3 Discourse of the commons as an analytical framework for African in-
digenous land tenure? 
 
3.1 A short introduction to the commons 
 
There is a link between this reconceptualisation and the discourse of the commons.95 
The term "commons" is often equated with the phrase "public domain" and thought to 
mean "a given right, a non-assigned right, an unclaimed right or an unmanaged re-
source".96 One problem with defining the commons is that it does not neatly fit into 
the conventional private/public dichotomy. It is often referred to as the private prop-
erty of a group, although this might not always be accurate because in many in-
                                                          
93  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
94  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
95  In Hardin 1968 Science 1244 the social and economic consequences when individuals are al-
lowed free and unlimited access to a form of commons are explained. The tragedy is that indi-
viduals will rationally seek to maximise their gains and exploit the commons, because they can 
benefit directly while costs are distributed among all the users of the commons. Hardin concludes 
that "[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" 
(Hardin 1968 Science 1243, 1244). For Hardin, the solution to this problem includes privatisation 
and regulation. 
96  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 114. 
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stances, commons regimes also recognise the rights of transient resource users 
(such as grazing or foraging) on an equal footing.97 The problem of classification is 
solved somewhat by Hess and Ostrom, on whose classification this review article 
relies. She identifies four broad classes of goods, as illustrated in the table below. 
 
  SUBTRACTABILITY 
E
X
C
L
U
S
IO
N
 
 Low High 
Difficult Public goods 
(e.g. Sunset / 
common knowl-
edge) 
Common-Pool Re-
sources  
(e.g. Irrigation sys-
tems, libraries) 
Easy  Club goods 
(e.g. Day-care cen-
tres/ country clubs) 
Private goods 
(e.g. Doughnuts / 
personal com-
puters) 
 
This classification leads to a definition of the commons (or common pool resources) 
as "a class of resources from which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves sub-
tractablity".98 
 
Excludability is about the control of access, while subtractability implies that the ex-
ploitation of the resource by one user affects the ability of the other users to exploit 
the resource.99 The difficulty of exclusion implies that means should be devised to 
prevent the free-rider problem; that is, to keep unauthorised users from benefiting 
from the resource.100 National, regional or local governments, communal groups, pri-
vate individuals or corporations can all be "owners" of a common-pool resource.101 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97  Meinzen-Dick, Mwangi and Dohrn 2006 www.capri.cgiar.org. 
98  Feeny et al 1990 Human Ecology 4. 
99  Feeny et al 1990 Human Ecology 3. 
100  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 120. 
101  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 120. 
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3.2 African indigenous land tenure as a commons? 
 
Would it be possible to classify the indigenous land rights system as a commons? 
Okoth-Ogendo touched on this issue in a previous paper102 where he defined com-
mons as "ontologically organised land and associated resources available exclu-
sively to specific communities, lineages or families operating as corporate entities". 
This can relate back to the two questions that Okoth-Ogendo asks,103 namely: who 
may have access (excludability) to land and who may control and manage the land 
resources (subtractability). 
 
Does the classification of Hess and Ostrom104 help in this regard? Excludability, ac-
cording to Hess and Ostrom,105 is difficult when it is impossible (or really hard) to de-
velop physical or institutional means to exclude beneficiaries.106 This creates a risk 
of exploitation if means are not devised to prevent unauthorised users from benefit-
ing, leading to the free rider problem.107 In the traditional African indigenous land law 
systems were in place to prevent the free-rider problem. This means that excludabil-
ity from land was managed within groups. Excludability became difficult once re-
sources became scarce, but pre-colonial African land tenure provided mechanisms 
within the political and social structures of communities to prevent the free-rider 
problem. An ownership paradigm, however, emphasises the rights of owners in rela-
tion to land, based on the information in the Deeds registry. When the Deeds registry 
is silent on who the owner is, or if the owner is the state, as is the case in big areas 
in the former homelands, the rights of the non-owners that might occupy the land 
under a different system are threatened. Such non-owners will have difficulty in an 
ownership paradigm to exclude others legally from the land. Despite this, some 
communities have been effective in managing access to and the control of land. 
 
When subtractability is high, this means that the use of one person subtracts from 
the quantity available to others. If subtractability is not limited or managed properly, 
                                                          
102  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
103  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
104  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 111. 
105  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 111. 
106  See Cousins' comments on the problems attendant on the system of common pool resources in 
rural areas, in chapter 5 (Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 122). 
107  When people benefit alone from using the resource, but share the burden. 
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then this will create problems of over-use.108 Again, when land was abundant in pre-
colonial times, subtractability was not such a big problem. However, with 80 percent 
of the population living on 17 percent of the land by the time apartheid came to an 
end, land became a scarce resource, and the use of land by one person subtracted 
from the amount of land available to others.109 
 
From this categorisation it can therefore be argued that African indigenous land is a 
type of common-pool resource (or commons), in that 1) it is difficult to devise rules to 
exclude, especially from the point of view of an "ownership paradigm",110 and 2) that 
the use of the land by one person does in fact subtract from the amount land avail-
able to others. 
 
4 The usefulness of the commons discourse in securing African commu-
nal land tenure 
 
Is communal land an unsolvable problem? Asked differently, is the commons neces-
sarily tragic? Common-pool resources (as Hess and Ostrom refer to them) should 
not be confused with open-access regimes, "where no one has the legal right to ex-
clude anyone from using a resource".111 In fact, many common-property regimes do 
sometimes control access to resources, even if the authority to control such access 
is not formally recognised.112 African indigenous land tenure would be such an in-
stance. This is especially true for groups the members of which know one another 
well and interact well. These groups are likely to be tied together by family, geogra-
                                                          
108  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 123. 
109  Even though access to land is, theoretically, available to all since the demise of apartheid, the 
author is of the opinion that this remains largely theoretical due to embedded practices inherited 
from the apartheid system, and as an effect of the poverty of the rural population. 
110  Singer refers to it as the "ownership model". He criticises this approach by saying "[i]f property 
means ownership, and if ownership means power without obligation, then we have created a 
framework for thinking about property that privileges a certain form of life – the life of the owner". 
He further criticises the notion of property on the basis that property rights are not bundled to-
gether and owned by one person (as is the case in indigenous land right systems in Africa), and 
that property rights describe not only the relationship between a person and a thing, but also re-
lationships between people. (This is also relevant for the indigenous land right system in Africa). 
See Singer Entitlement 3, 5. 
111  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 121. 
112  Hess and Ostrom 2003 LCP 123. 
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phy and so forth and are generally very effective in establishing effective property 
regimes.113 
 
Okoth-Ogendo confirms Hess and Ostrom's statement that access to the resources 
is often regulated. Okoth-Ogendo proclaims that the African (land) commons are 
managed by an inverted social hierarchy pyramid – with the top presenting the fam-
ily, the middle the clan and lineage, and the base the community. However, deci-
sions on each level are not made collectively, but rather individually with common 
values and principles taken into account on each level. On the community level deci-
sion-making entails the protection of the territory on behalf of the whole group, which 
means that radical title belongs to the members of the group across generations.114 
Access to resources of the commons, on the other hand, is open only to individuals 
and groups that qualify on the basis of their membership of a specific group. (This 
correlates with what Rose said). This is based on the existence of reciprocal obliga-
tions within the group. The quantum and quality of this right of access will depend on 
the "membership category".115 
 
Access to land in African indigenous land right systems is controlled through mem-
bership (of a family, lineage or community), and individuals can acquire this access 
on account of their membership.116 This access is specific to the kind of resource it 
aims at managing. Access is maintained on the basis of production,117 and therefore 
has clearly defined internal rules. The nature and content of such an access right is 
therefore multiple, making it impossible for various people to hold a right in or right of 
access to the same particular piece of land.118 
 
Management of the resource, on the other hand, is within the community's power,119 
and is exercised by the political authority in a society. This sovereignty is based on 
an "inverted hierarchy" where, as was pointed out above, the tip of the pyramid is the 
authority of the family unit (usually over cultivation and residence), the next layer the 
                                                          
113  Rose 2009 Social Philosophy and Policy 5. 
114  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
115  Okoth-Ogendo 2005 www.plaas.org.za. 
116  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 100. 
117  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 100. 
118  Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 112-113. 
119  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 101. 
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clan or lineage (usually with authority over grazing, hunting or the intergenerational 
distribution of resources), and the base the authority of the community (usually relat-
ing to defence, dispute settlement and transport facility maintenance). It is therefore 
clear that control and management of land resources are not the responsibility of one 
authority (the state) alone. This structure facilitates the individual's right of access to 
the land by virtue of membership of the community.120 The right to access and power 
to manage the resources do not fit in neatly into the ownership paradigm in which 
they are often forced to operate, as no one person or group has exclusive control 
over the access to land, or the management of the resources. Social organisation 
plays a key role in granting access to a resource as well as security of tenure. As 
Okoth-Ogendo states: "rights of access under these systems are indeed 'secure' as 
long as they are being asserted; individuals have real rights under those systems; 
and indigenous social structures are able to manage land resources sustainably".121 
Law and social organisation are therefore equally important in securing indigenous 
land rights.122 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This contribution has shown that pre-colonial and present-day African indigenous 
land tenure is unique and struggles to fit into the common law notion of "property" 
and "ownership". It has also been argued that the commons (or common property 
resources, as Ostrom termed it) might be a more comfortable fit for the African in-
digenous land tenure system. The commons is a framework that at least needs to be 
considered more closely when analysing African indigenous land tenure. It offers an 
explanation of how it is possible that various people can have a claim or similar 
claims to the same property. At the very least it offers an alternative vocabulary to 
describe African indigenous land tenure in a common law legal framework. 
 
It has been argued that the language of ownership creates particular problems in cir-
cumscribing African indigenous land tenure. The problem is solved to an extent by 
                                                          
120  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 101. 
121  Okoth-Ogendo "Nature of Land Rights" 101. 
122  See also chapter 5, where Cousins states that "[p]eople often view land rights as underpinning 
the continuity of social units as well as securing access to the basic conditions of human exis-
tence. Tenure security derives in large part from locally legitimate landholding rather than the 
law" (Cousins "Characterising 'Communal' Tenure" 113). 
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asking "who owns what interest in land" instead of who owns the land.123 Since this 
question is still based on the notion of ownership, it is probably better to ask, in 
"commons" language,  "in whom, for what purposes and for how long should an allo-
cation of power in respect of particular aspects of land be made?"124 
 
What is clear is that access to land and control over the land are more complex than 
in common law, where an owner is regarded as having both powers. In African indi-
genous land tenure, a number of persons can each hold a power or a combination of 
powers in the same piece of land. The level of control will differ in each case, de-
pending on the socio-political organisation of the group.125 The discourse of the 
commons, although not fully elaborated on here, provides for such possibilities. 
 
The problem is still: how do we formalise African indigenous land tenure in the regis-
tration system, or indeed whether or not we should. The problem is that the South 
African registration system does not allow for the registration of African indigenous 
land rights, but rather classifies rights in terms of the common law notion of "owner-
ship". Moreover, a study by Kingwill has shown the effect of titling on tenure security 
in two communities in the Eastern Cape in South Africa, and found that in black free-
hold areas "property relationships between various associated members of families 
or lineages are more relevant in defining ownership than the currency of title 
deeds".126 Therefore, even in cases where rights or tenure are titled, people still 
evaluate their rights and security in tenure in the social context rather than relying on 
who the "title deed" owner is. Pienaar proposes a land information system that works 
parallel with the deeds registry system, recording the various interests in land.127 If 
the formalisation of land rights is found to be the only route to secure tenure, this 
seems like a viable option. In this context, the framework of the commons might help 
by providing a vocabulary or mechanism through which to do it. Such formalisation 
should aim to recognise existing occupancy of the land and should include a wide 
spectrum of rights, not just ownership as favoured in common law. This is where the 
vocabulary of the commons might prove to be helpful. 
                                                          
123  Okoth-Ogendo 1989 Africa 9. 
124  Okoth-Ogendo 1989 Africa 9. 
125  Okoth-Ogendo 1989 Africa 11. 
126  Kingwill "Custom-building Freehold Title" 185. 
127  Pienaar "Land information". 
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